

Long-Term Security (Policy) Needs

DOE National Collaboratories Meeting
August 11th, 2004

Von Welch, Frank Siebenlist, Sam Meder

Policy Needs of Collaboration


- A collaboration is defined by the combination of the policies of all its participants
 - Everyone wants their say in the final policy decisions
- Everyone does this today in their own site in their own way
- Today in the Grid we are dealing mainly with static policies, combined manually
 - Hard for one party to change their policy
 - Hard to do delegation
- How to allow combinations of policies from everyone in the way resource owner wants?



the globus alliance

www.globus.org

See Jane get authorized...




Delegation is the key Feature for the users

- From Resource owner to VO
 - “This VO can use cycles, disk, instrument”
- From VO to user
 - Von is a member of group FOO and hence should be allowed to run jobs
- From user to user
 - Frank can read my data
- From user to service (job)
 - This service can use VO/my resources and access my data

Work in Progress: Grid Authorization Policy Architecture (GRAPA)

Key is structuring
Security system



Challenges

- Writing policies are hard
 - Policies are often “understood” and not written down
 - Writing a policy and verifying it is what you want is hard
- Matching of policy languages to other Grid languages
- As Miron says, when something goes wrong or is denied, figuring out why...
- How do we make credentials easy and trustworthy?



Languages that “drive” the Grid applications

- High level languages
 - Agreement negotiation, job description, scheduling, etc.
 - ws-agreement, jsdl, scheduling language efforts underway in GGF...
- Policy languages
 - Grid-mapfile, XACML, PERMIS, etc.
- How to minimize and deal with mismatches between languages?

Language Mismatches

- **Examples**
 - File vs directory vs dataset
 - Service vs server vs cluster
- **Consequences:**
 - Any imperfect mapping of application language primitives to policy language equivalents always necessitates the granting of too many rights
 - In the case of compromise, the granting of too many rights leads to excessive exposure
 - When services work on behalf of other services and rights are delegated, the consequences become more prominent

A Slide for Miron

- Complicated system like this will need good error reporting/troubleshooting
- Lots of standards and software reuse are good, but result in lots of layers of software
- Problem is: Error == stack trace
 - Not useful to the end user
 - Each layer has some of needed context to understand error
 - User's read first two lines of an error message
- How to translate trace to something useful?
 - Today this is a manual, brittle process of identify stack and map to useful message

DOE's new realities...

- We've partly surrendered the desktop and servers
 - Not clear how much yet...
- Our desktops and servers will be compromised
 - How do we know when that happens?
- How to express levels of trust in different resources?
- Cleaning up compromised resources will be routine...
 - How to make this least painful?
- Unknowingly deploy compromised resources
 - How to limit the consequences?

Conclusions

- Need to find ways of writing, verifying, distributing, combining and debugging policies from multiple sources
- Writing policies is not common today
- These need to be coherent with the other languages we use so make evaluation possible
- Need agreement to requirements and semantics

Final Conclusion

- Firewalls will probably be a problem